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CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY POWERS IN BOND
CASES IN TItE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES.
Ix the April number (1878) of the AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
(ante,p, 209), we attempted to show that this court had misconceived
the decisions of a state court (that of the Supreme Court of Missouri) in the construction of a statute alleged to be violative of the
constitution of that state, on a question of power to subscribe aid
to railroads conferred upon townships (Cass County v. Johnson),
and by the decision had practically subverted the constitutional
provision, although professing to follow the state decisions which
were shown to be directly contrary to it. Subsequently (in April
1878) this view of the 'article was sustained by two decisions of
the Supreme Court of Missouri, in cases from Platte and Lafayette
counties in that state, directly involving the questions passed on
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Cass County v. Johnson, in each of which cases the construction attempted to be placed
on the.former decisions of the state court by the Supreme Court
of the United States was expicssly disavowed.
It is now proposed to present briefly the doctrine of the Supreme
Court of the United States, in the construction of such powers,
i. e., statutory powers in bond cases, and to show,
1st. That such construction is unwarranted and subversive of
the law of powers applicable to cases of special agency.
2d. That the application of the law of estoppel to such cases by
this court is unwarrantable and without authority of law.
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3d. That its system of so-called contracts built upon such rrinciples is artificial, and must be, eventually, abandoned or overthrown.
The doctrine of this court upon the construction of statutory
powers; as granted to municipalities, counties and organized townships, to aid in construction of railroads and other public improvements (for it does not give a like construction in ordinary cases,
as of individuals or of private corporations: Iloyd Accptance
Cases, 7 Wall. 666), as gathered from its numerous decisions in
such cases, from Knox County v. Aspinwall down, seems to be
this:That where legislative authority has been given to a municipality,
o.r to a county, or to an organized township, to subscribe for the
stock of a railroad company, and to issue bonds-municipal, county
or township-in payment, but only on some precedent condition,
such as a popular vote favoring the subscription: and when it may
be gathered from the legislative enactment that the officers of the
municipality, or county, or'township, wer6 invested with power to
decide whether the condition precedent has been complied with,
their recital that it has been, made in the bonds issued by them and
'held by a bona fide purchaser, is conclusive of the fact and binding
upon the municipality, or county, or township, for the recital is
itself a decision of the fact by the appointed tribunal: Town of
Colonza v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484 ; F-enice v. Murdock, 92 Id. 494;
Marcy v. Township of Oswego, 92 Id. 637; Humboldt Township
v. Lbng et al., 92 Id. 642; Mercer County v. Hackett, 1 Wall.
83 ; ran -ostrop v. Madison City, 1 Id. 291 ; St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, 16 Id. 644; Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. (U.
S.) 287 ; Knox County v. A,pinwall, 21 Id. 539 ; Dillon on Municipal Corporation, 2d ed., see. 419 and cases cited.
This peculiar construction of the law governing principal and
constituent involves three essential assumptions (none of which are
legitimate) in order to support the fore-ordained conclusion, which
is reached'by working up to it, rather than deduced from valid and
legitimate inference; that is to say :1. That the legislative authority to subscribe for stock, upon a
prescribed precedent condition, invests the agency constituted by
it with the powers of a "tribunal"- authorized to decide whether
the condition precedent has been complied with.
2. That the recital by such constituted agency, of the compliance
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with such precedent condition in bonds issfied by them [in assumed
pursuance of the legislative authority] and held by a bona fide
purchaser, is eonclusive of the fact that the precedent condition
has been complied with.
3. That the municipality, or county, or township, is conclusively
bound by the recitals made by such constituted agencies, in bonds
so held as aforesaid, and is estopped to show to the contrary, the
recital itself being a decision by the appointed " tribunal."
The doctrine thus constituted and formulated will be considered
hereafter in one view.
And first, as to this statutory "tribunal."
It has never beeih
pretended to have been "gathered from the legislative enactment"
in any of these cases that the legislative purpose was to give this
extraordinary power of being absolute judges to pass irrevocably
upon conditions on which depended their own power or authority
to act at all, to local trustees and commissioners. On the contrary
it is the transparent intention in each of these cases that certain
things prescribed as pre-requisites shall first be done, and when
done and only fter they have bee, done, are these local trustees
empowered to do anything, much less to bind any one conclusively
not only by their acts, but by their recitals of the performance of
those things upon which only any valid action could be based. But
the only "gathering from the enactment" deemed necessary by this
court, apparently is, that if authority to issue bondsis given, although
dependent upon precedently prescribed conditions, if an agency is
constituted to issue them, this clothes the agency with a power as
a "tribunal" to decide finally upon the performance of the conditions and to bind conclusively by their recitals of such performance. As well might it be said that the trustee in a deed of trust
(who is also a " tribunal" under this view), is invested with authority
to decide finally upon the conditions of the deed so that the grantor
would be estopped from sh.owing to the contrary, although the
admitted law is that the recitals of such trustee in the deed of conveyance which he "issues" in assumed conformity with the power
given him, is not even prima facie evidence of the facts recited,
except by agreement to that effect, contained in 'the instrument,
between the contracting parties.
Put it is not only repugnant to law, but also to natural justice,
that any mere agency, constituted for a special purpose, and having
defined and prescribed powers, whose exercise is to be dependent
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upon a precedent condition which is also clearly defined and prescribed, should bind its principal to any parties otherwise than by
actually complying with the limitations imposed upon it; (and if
it does not, no power is really conferred upon it to do anything),
and its recital can have no influence, either way, to control the
truth or fact of the matter. To hold to the contrary-and this
court has always so held in such cases-is to make it impracticable
to fix limitations upon powers thus intrusted, and to invite collusion between the "tribunals" and bond-jobbers for the ultimate
benefit of so-called bona fide purchasers. The construction of such
ppwers herein urged has the substantial endorsement of this court
in the _loyd Acceptance Cases, 7 Wall. 666, in which were involved
commercial paper, statutory powers, a "tribunal" and bona fide
purchasers, but fortunately for the merits the defendant was neither
a municipality, county or township. It is there held, "that a person dealing with an agent, knowing that he acts only by virtue of
a delegated power, must, at his peril, see that the paper on which
he relies comes within the power under which the agent acts. And
this applies to every person who takes the paper afterwards; for it
is to be kept in mind that the protection which commercial usage
throws around negotiable paper cannot be used to establish the
authority by which it was originally issued." And it is somewhat
singular that in no treatise on the subject of agency, and in no
decision by any respectable court, either in England or America,
has such construction been given to powers, as is held and persisted
in by this court in all cases of municipal bonds. On the contrary,
it is everywhere said and held that an authority derived from a
statute, prescribing clearly the laws of its exercise, must be strictly
pursued in all its provisions, in order to be binding upon those conferring the authority: (2 Kent's Commentaries 621 (marginal page);
Story on Agency, 3d ed., sects. 105, 126, 133, 136, 139 and 307 a;
1 Parsons oV Contracts, 5th ed., 44, 45 ; 2 Wharton's Law of Evidence, sects. 1170, 1178; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 4th
ed.. 658, 660; Cooley on Taxation 197, 199 and 216; Dillon on
Mun. Corp., 2d ed., sects. 372, 418 and 419 ; Chitty on Contracts,
10th ed., 229; Smith's Mercantile Law, 3d ed., 173-174; 1 American Leading Cases, 5th ed., 653, 680; Sedgwick Constitutional
and Statutory Law 342, 385; 3 Cush. (Iass.) 511; 8 Allen (Id.)
10 Id. 528; Baxter v. Larnont 60 111. 237; Geiger v. Askbury,
49 Cal. 571).
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The sole authority relied upon by this' court in support of its
peculiar views (except its own former decisions), appears to be the
case of .Royal Briti.ih Bank v. Tarquand, 6 E. & B. 327. Let us
see what this case is, as stated in Kn'wx County v. Aspinwall, where
it was first invoked: It was an action upon a bond against the
defendant as the manager of a joint-stock company. The defence
was a want of power under the deed of settlement or charter to
give the bond. One of the clauses in the charter provided that
the directors might borrow money on bonds in such sums as should,
from time to time, by a general resolution of the company, be
authorized to be borrowed. The resolution passed was considered
defective. JERvIs, Ch. B., in delivering the judgment of the
court, said: "We nmy now take it for granted that the dealings
with these companies are not like dealings with other (i. e., ordinary)
partnerships, and that the parties dealing with them are bound to
read the statute and deed of settlement. But they are not bound
to do niore. And the party here, on reading the deed of settlement, would find, not a prohibition from borrowing, but a permission to do so on certain conditions. Finding that the authority
might be made complete by a resolution, he would have the right
to infer the fact of a resolution authorizing that which, on the face
of the document, appeared to be legitimately done." The distinction between this case and those which refer to it for support cannot
be better expressed than in the words of Mr. Justice MILLER, in
his dissenting opinion in Jflumboldt Tounship v. Long et al., 92
U. S., at page 650, in which Judges DAVIs and FIELD concurred:
"If the English judges who decided the case of the Royal British
Bank v. Tarquand, on the authority of which Knox County v.
AsIpin tall was based, were here to-day, they would be filled with
astonishment at the result of their decision. The bank in that
case was not a corporation. It was a joint-stock company, in the
nature of a partnership. The action was against the manager as
such, and the question concerned his power to borrow money.
This power depended in this particular case on a resolution of the
company. The charter or deed of settlement gave the power, and
when it was exercised the court held that the lender was not bound
to examine the records of the company to see if the resolution had
been legally' sufficient. That .was a private partnership. Its
papers and records were not open to public inspection. The managers and directors were not officers of the law, whose powers were
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defined by statute, nor was the existence of the condition on which
the power depended to be ascertained by the inspection of public
and official records, made and kept by officers of the law for that
purpose. In all these material circumstances that case differed
widely from those now before us."
The fatal weakness of the doctrine here criticised lies in this:
the-giving of any effect whatever to the recital in the bonds (although
indispensable to the effectual working of the machinery of the "tribunal," and for laying the foundation for the so-called estoppel), or
distinguishing between cases in which there happened to be no recital,
as in Marsh v. Pulton County. The essential and indispensable
fact must appear that the power was exercised according to the conditions imposed, when the bonds were issued (and the recital or nonrecital of compliance can have no influence upon the fact), in order
to make the act of issuing valid and binding upon the county or municipality. And the giving of the power is not questioned, in most
cases, but whether the conditional power.conferred has been exercised
upon the terms of the grant; for if it has not, no authority to issue at
all is either given or proposed to be given. The pretext that because
the officers are authorized to issue the bonds if the prescribed conditions are performed, that therefore they are thus also appointed
to ascertain and adjudge upon these facts so as to exclude evidence
of the truth of the matter from being produced, because of being
in the hands of (what they call) a bona fide holder who chooses to
assume that the conditions were complied with-whether so recited
or not-seems unworthy of the court and unjust to litigants. And
although the giving of such effect to the recital may seem to follow
legitimately from the assumptiont in the first instance, that the
investiture of power to decide is implied by the constituting of such
a tribunal to issue bonds upon a condition, this will not avail any' hing, since the assumption itself has been shown to be without
foundation, and contrary to the principles of law governing such
cases. Nor is the dilemma in the least relieved by the final assumption that the municipality is estopped from showing the truth as
against its own (assumed) investiture of power, and the recital of
compliance with its prescribed precedent conditions by its constituted agency, when the bonds issued are in the hands of so-called
bona fide holders of said bonds. For if the first assumption is unwarranted, to wit: that the giving of power upon condition that certain
pre-requisites are first met, invests the constituted agency with final
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power to pass judicially upon the compliance with them; so also
the further inference that the recital of such compliance is conclusively (or at all) binding upon the municipality or county, and the
final consequential inference of estoppel to show to the contrary;
for the corner-stone being upon sand, the.'superstructure topples
$ I
'
,1
over with it.
should
have
Indeed it seems incomprehensible that such a court
built up such a structure upon such slender fouiidations, if unwarranted assumptions and inferences from them can fairly be dignified
by that term, except upon the view indicated in the former article,
heretofore referred to, that the court constituted itself the guardian
of the peoples' rights and of the public credit, with which it had
neither power nor occasion to deal, and havinggone thus far has
been logically compelled to go farther or abandon its ground, a
thing which the judiciary is proverbially reluctant to do. And this
self-constituted guardianship, instead of being clallenged ind repudiated as it should have been, at least by the bar, who are the sentinels of the people against either judicial or legislative encroachment, has been attempted to be vindicated and even applauded by
corporation lawyers, who have assumed that ",this great court, this
more than Amphictyonic council" (which last appellative is really
an insult, if history is to be believed), sitting in serene majesty and
unruffled composure, was the only court capable of considering such
a subject impartially, and that the state courts were but, the, mere
instruments and exponents of local prejudice. Instead of such supereminent authority thus claimed and exercised, the real authority of
the court in such cases, is only this: To ascertain intelligently and
impartially what the decisions of the state courts construing, their
acknowledges, sometimes
own laws are and to follow them. This, it,
absolutely, sometimes qualifiedly, but rarely performs. ,And the
claim of being free to pass upon, the questions originally because
"-commercial paper" (so called) is usually involved, is on a footing
with the other arrogations of power, 'and even, this is deferentially
abandoned when the United States is a party, as in the case 'of the
,
Floyd Aeceptances, 7 Wall. 666.
2. As regards the novelty of the application of the doctrine of
e'stopliel, in such cases as these, little more, need be said, since some
consideration of it has necessarily been' given in reviewing the
primary question as'to the 6onstrction ofpower. But it may be
safely said that in 'cases Wherethe power to bind' does not 'exist,
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and never existed because of actual non-compliance with the precedently imposed conditions, there can be no estoppel, and this
whatever the bonds so issued may recite or fail to recite, and however bonaJide the holder. No one has been rightfully misled in
such cases, and the municipality, or county, has done nothing having a tendency towards misleading. On the contrary, the inquirer
is explicitly informed of the conditional terms of the subscription
by the statute itself, and if he chooses to infer rather than examine
or ascertain he should suffer the consequences of a mistaken and
unwarranted inference. None of the essential elements of an
estoppel in pais can be truthfully invoked by a bona fide holder- of
bonds so issued, purchased without examination or inquiry ind with
a blind reliance upon recitals of precedent conditions performed,
when the validity of the issuing is contingent upon the fact of
actual performance. He has not in good faith on his part, been
induced by the voluntary intelligent action of the party against
whom it is alleged to change his position. No inducement whatever is held out to any person to change his position by the
authorization, upon a guarded and explicit prohibition against issuing until certain prelimina-ry pro-requisites have been met to issue
bonds, if the precedent conditions are performed. The parties
principal do not approach each other, nor is any one authorized even
by implication, to offer or represent anything to the bona fide purchaser, but, on the contrary, it appears on the face of the authority
that it is contingent upon the prior performance of preliminary
conditions. To assume or infer the performance of such conditions
from its recital or to assume or infer the non-performance from its
non-recital is equally unwarrantable, and no man can be truly said
to have acted in good faith who does so.
3. The system of so called contrhets, built -upon such principles
is artificial and is subversive of justice.
This is but the statement of an inevitable conclusion, as the
result of deduction froin what has been already said in the article.
It is sufficient objection to such a system that it imposes burdens,
and creates liabilities where none existed, and assumes and
enforces a contract never made. Nor is this the only wrong done, though it seems great enoughl
in all conscience; the effect of such a course bf decision and its
consequences has been wide-spread and far-reaching.
It has made the county or municipal "tribunals" usually con-
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posed of unlearned men who are not always of known integrity-the centre of an influence as corrupting to them as it has been
injurious to those they claimed to represent; unscrupulous persons
in the employ of unprincipled capitalists or of sham and swindling
corporations, made no scruple to "buy " such tribunals or a majority of them, in cases where the precedent conditions had notoriously not been complied with, knowing that the "recitals" of a
falsity was as available as if the truth, in the hands of a "bona
fide holder." Reciprocally the "tribunals" offered themselves for
sale to the highest bidder, so that communities became to be the
prey of vultures from the outside and cormorants within, until in
some instances violence and bloodshed was invoked to lut a stop tothis villainy. Finally, cnfidence was almost wholly withheld, as
being the only adequate protection, and enterprises deserving of
support were left to languish or decay. The result is that commercial, manufacturing and productive interests have been seriously
prejudiced and retarded for many years past.
The rationale of the doctrine with all its fallacies and false
inferences was fairly stated *and unmercifully exposed by Mr. Justice MILLER (FIELD and DAVIS doncurring), in his dissenting
opinion in Rumboldt Townshi v. Long et al., 92 U. S. 646, at the
close of the October Term 1875 of the Supreme Court of the United
States, after ten or twelve such judgments following Knox ounty
v. Aspinwall, had been rendered. He said : "I understand these
opinions to hold that when the constitution of the state, or an act
of its legislature, imperatively forbids these municipalities to issue
bonds in aid of railroads -or other similar enterprises, all such bonds
issued thereafter will be void. But if there exists any authority
whatever to issue such bonds, no restrictions, limitations or conditions imposed by the legislature in the exercise of that authority
can be made effectual if they be disregarded by the officers of those
corporations. * * * It is therefore clear that so long as this doctrine is upheld, it is not in the power of the legislature to authorize these corporations to issue bonds under any special circumstances, or with any limitation in the use of the power, which may
not be disregarded with impunity.
"It may be the wisest policy to prevent the issue of such bondso
altogether; but it is not for this court to dictate a policy for the
states on that subject. The result of the decision is a most extraordinary one. It stands alone in the construction of powers speVOL. XXVI.-78
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cifically granted, whether the source of the power be a state constitutio. an act of the legislature, a resolution of a corporate body,
or a written authority given by an individual. It establishes that,
of all the class of agencies, public or private, whether acting as
officers whose powers are created by statute or by other corporations
or by individuals, and whether the subject-matter relates to duties
imposed by the nation, or the state, or by private corporations, or
by individuals, on this one class of agents, and in regard to the
exercise of this one class of powers alone must full, absolute and
uncontrollable authority be conferred on them, or none. In reference to municipal bonds alone, the law is, that no authority to issue
them can be given which is capable of any effectual condition or
limitation as to its exercise.
"The power of taxation, which has cen repeatedly stated by
the court to be the most necessary of all legislative powers, and
least capable of restriction, may by positive enactment be limited.
If the constitution of a state should declare that no tax hiall be
levied exceeding a certain per cent. of the value of the property
taxed, any statute imposing a larger rate would be void as to the
excess. If the legislature should say that no municipal corporation should assess a tax beyond aicertain per cent., the courts would
not hesitate to pronounce a levy in excess of that rate void: But
when the legislature undertakes to limit the power of creating a
debt by these corporations, which will require a tax to pay it in
excess of that rate of taxation, this court says there is no power
to do this effectually.
_No suci principle has ever been applied by
by this court, or by any other court, to a state, to the United States,
to a Pricate corporation, or to individuals. [The italics are mine.]
I challenge the production of a case in which it has beeen so applied. In the Floyd Acceptance Cases, 7 Wall. 666, in which the
Secretary of War had accepted time drafts drawn on him by a
contractor, which, being negotiable, came into the hands of a bona
fide purchaser before due, we held that they were void for want of
authority to accept them. And this case has been cited by this
court more than once without question. No one would think, for
a moment, of holding that a power of attorney made by an indi.viduad cannot be so limiied as to make any. one dealing with the
agent bound by the limitation, or that the agent's construction of
his power bound the principal. Nor has it ever been contended
that an officer of a private corporation can, by exceeding his autho-
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rity, when that authority is express, is open and notorious, bind
the corporation which he professes to represent.
"The simplicity of the device by which this doctrine is uplhehl
as to municipal bonds, is worthy the admiration of all who i ish to
profit by the frauds of municipal officers. It is that, w]enev er a
condition or limitation is imposed upon the power of these officers
in issuing bonds, they are the sole and final judges of 1he extent
of those powers. If they decide to issue them, the law presimics that
the conditions on which their powers depended existed, or that the
limitation upon the exercise of the power has been complied with;
and especially and particularly if they make a fidse recital of the
fact on which the power depends in the paper they issue, this false
recital has the effect of creating a power which had no existence
without it.
"This remarkable result is always defended on the ground that
the paper is negotiable, and the purchaser is ignorant of the falsehood. But in the _loyd Acceptance Cases this court held, and it
was necessary to hold so there, that the inquiry into the authority
by which negotiable paper was issued was just the same as if it
were not negotiable, and that if no such authority existed, it could
not be aided by giving the paper that form. In County Bond
Cases it seems to be otherwise. In that case the court held that the
party taking such paper was bound to know the law as it affected
the authority of the officer who issued it. In County Bond Cases,
while this principle is not expressly contradicted, it is held that the
paper, though issued without authority of law, and in opposition to
its express provisions, is valid.
"There is no reason in the nature of the condition on which the
power depends in these cases why any purchaser should not take
notice of its existence before he buys. * * * In the matter of a
power depending on such facts as in these cases, in any other class
of cases, it would be held that, before buying these bonds, the
purchaser must look to those matters on which their validity
depended. They are all public, all open, all accessible. * * *
But in favor of purchasers of municipal bonds, all this is to be disregarded, and a debt contracted without authority and in violation
of express statute, is to be collected out of the property of the
helpless man who owns any in that district. I say helpless advisedly, because these are not his agents. They are the officers of
the law, appointed or.elected without his consent, acting contrary,
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perhaps, to his wishes. Surely if the acts of any class of officers
should be valid only when doaw in conformity to law, it is those
who manage the affiirs of town., counties and villages, in creating
debts, which not they, but the property owners must pay."
After distinguishing between these cases and that of _Royal
Briti.sh Bank v. Tarquand, lie concludes as follows
'" It is easy to say, and looks plausible when said, that if municipal corporations put bonds on the market, they must pay them
when they become due. But it is another thing to say that when
an officer created by the law exceeds the authority conferred upon
him, and in open violation of law issues these bonds, the owner
of property lying within the corporation must pay them, though
he had no part whatever in their issue, and no power to prevent it.
This latter is the true view of the matter. As the corporation
could only exercise such power as the law conferred, the issue of
the bonds was not the act of the corporation. It is a false assumption to say that the corporation put them on the market. If one
of two innocent persons must suffer for thie unauthorized act of the
township or county officers, it is clear that lie who could, before
parting with his money, have. easily ascertained that they were
unauthorized, should lose- rather than the property holder, who
might not know anything of the matter, and if lie did. had no
power to prevent the wrong."
These suggestions of legal objection to the doctrine so long and
persistently held and enforced by this court are unanswerable,for they are based upon principles of truth, justice, and the law.
The doctrine prevailing at present is in hostility to all these, and
has nothing but a repetition of exposed errors to support it.
Before the final returns of the writs of rzandam?6 so numerously
issued have been finally adjudicated, there will be, in some way or
other, the reaching of a result very different from what now
appears. For it is in the nature of the case that such open and
flagrant violations of the principles of law and of justice, should
not have free or uninterrupted course-and being combatted to
the last, as they must be, will be finally abandoned and disavowed.
JAs. F. MISTER.
Kanas City, Missouri.

